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I suppose, if narcissism could overcome boredom,
I ought to sit down and read through The
Diploma Disease [19761 to make sure, but I do
not think there are many passages which I would
blush to read because I now think I got them
badly wrong. I am not aware of having under-
gone any major intellectual conversion since I
wrote the book, but I have learned things that
would make me want to alter some of the things
I said, and to put some things differently. I
ended the preface by saying that many of the
'conclusions' which I presented in that book were
in fact hypotheses which the research of IDS
colleagues would doubtless throw some light on.
Indeed it has.
Before I explain how, perhaps I should begin by
summarising what the book originally tried to
say. Briefly, the 'message' was as follows:
the 'bureaucratisation of economic life' in all
modern societies is making selection for jobs!
careers by educational attainment more and
more universal. From this fact flows a variety
of consequences diagrammed in the chart
below:
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First, the level of qualification required for any
particular job tends to rise over time, because of
overproduction of job-seekers (educated unem-
ployment) and competition between professional
bodies and employing organisations to 'tap the
pool of talent' at the highest possible point. So
there is more and more schooling (over and above
the generally desirable extension of basic educa-
tion) for reasons which have nothing to do with
the actual knowledge acquisition necessary for
doing jobs. Nor does it have much to do with
personal development and self-fulfilment, or
learning for its own sake, since a lot of the
schooling is 'reluctant schooling'the ritual
acquisition of qualifications necessary to get jobs.
(The triad of alternative educational purposes-
a) learning for self-fulfilment, for personal
development, for 'its own sake', etc; b) learning
to do jobs; and c) learning to get jobsplays an
important role in the book.)
All this reluctant schooling is very expensive to
society. And it may well produce people at the
highest levels whobecause of the reluctant and
ritual nature of their prolonged schoolinghave
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attitudes towards work, and towards self-
advancement by competitive conformity to
external (rather than internalised) authorities,
which are far from likely to transform them into
productive, innovative, public spirited managers
and administrators. It also has 'incapacitating'
consequences at lower levels because, as graduat-
ing final certificates become more and more
important for life chances so, too, do selection
exams within the educational system. The crucial
selection exams which track people and deter-
mine what sort of final diplomas they can get
may be postponed under egalitarian pressures (as
from 11 + to 16+ in Britain), but somewhere in
the system they remain and their importance is
steadily enhanced. As they come to dominate the
curriculum, there is a 'backwash' effect: the
preparatory functions of primary and junior
secondary schoolspreparing the 'successful'
minority for selection exam success and further
educationtends to dominate their terminal
educational functionspreparing the 'unsuccess-
ful' majority for life and entry into work. This
increases the problems of 'relevance' of the basic
educational cycle.
All these tendencies, found in all societies, are
exacerbated in developing countries for a number
of reasons: because the stakes in the diploma
competition are so much higher (greater scarcity
of wage/salary jobs and vastly greater income
differentials); because of the lack of resources
necessary for styles of education which combat
rote-memorising and exam-centred ritualism;
because there are less certain learning-for-its-
own-sake traditions; because the wide cultural
gap between rural traditions and the imported
modern sector culture is greater, and so on. In
fact a comparison of Britain, Japan, Sri Lanka
and Kenya suggested a systematic 'late develop-
ment effect': the later a country starts its push to
modernisation, the more quickly and the more
seriously the diploma disease takes hold.
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Biased Sample?
A number of the points that follow can be
subsumed under one general observation. My
diploma disease model was very much abstracted
from a certain type of educational system. The
British and the British-legacy systems of Sri
Lanka, Kenya and Tanzania were my chief
examples, together with those of Japan and
China. Those systems have in common the
following features:
a high proportion of higher education in
general arts and science rather than in pro-
fessional subjects;
quite strict rationing by ability, rather than
by the purse, for higher education oppor-
tunity;
a system of national examinations with
universal standards to use for that ability
selection;
well developed systems of career bureaucracy
(at least in government, and to varying
degrees in the private sector) and a tradition
of the 'generalist' administrator.
The inclusion in our study of Mexico which does
not share these features was therefore highly
instructive.
Vocational and General Schooling
In the first place, the case of Mexico showed-
particularly the comparative labour market
studies with Sri Lankathat my discussion of
the use of certificates in the job market did not
distinguish clearly enough between vocational
qualifications and certificates of competence in
general education subjects. A diagram will help
to clarify the matter. It oversimplifies somewhat;
sometimes there is a two-stage selection process,
at junior and at senior secondary level, instead
of the single link between 'basic' and 'further'
education pictured here, but the simplified scheme
will suit our purposes.
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Implicit in the diploma disease model is the
assumption that employers use educational certi-
ficates primarily as 'screening' devicesas
measures of general ability (intelligence and
powers of application) which indicate a person's
likely 'trainability' over a whole range of skills,
rather than as indicators of the cognitive and
other skills which he has acquired as 'human
capital' through his schooling. Clearly, this is
more likely to be true at links A and D in the
diagram, when people come into the job market
with certificates of competence in general educa-
tion subjectsbasic literacy and numeracy, his-
tory and geography or a university training in
arts or sciencethan when they come with
clearly career-relevant qualifications in engineer-
ing or accountancy or nursing or pharmacy at
link C. At C, employers are much more likely to
be interested in acquired human capital, in what
a person has studied and how much he knows
than in measures of his general 'trainability'.
Whether the bulk of certificate-using recruitment
goes through link C, or through links A or D,
is therefore very likely in any given society to
colour general perceptions of the meaning of
certificates as signals, In that regard, there is a
striking difference between Mexico and Sri
Lanka. Mexican education is much more voca-
tionally oriented at all levels than the Sri Lanka
system. The latter is much more influenced by
the aristocratic emphasis on 'for its own sake'
education (humanities and 'pure' science, plus
social science as bastard latter-day humanities
rather than as disciplines-for-use) which was
derived from the British model. At the junior
secondary level in Mexico, only a little over 50
per cent of students were taking general courses
in 1973, many of the remainder being enrolled in
those of the 8,000 private institutions in Mexico
offering training in all kinds of occupations-
technical and commercialthat accept primary
school graduates. At the senior secondary level
there are a variety of technical institutions, most
notably the vocational school which also prepares
students for entrance to the National Polytechnic.
In the National University, the country's largest,
in 1974 fewer than 10 per cent of the students
took courses in general arts and humanities. In
Sri Lanka, on the other hand, although the very
brightest students are creamed off into the two
prestige faculties of engineering and medicine,
the bulk of students at the tertiary level (some
86 per cent in 1967) are taking general arts or
science degrees, and at the secondary level voca-
tional training is practically nonexistent.
These differences are clearly reflected in the
institutional rules which govern recruitment in the
two countries. Mexican employers seem to take
note only of what a person has studied and to
what levelsecondary, senior secondary or
universityhe or she has studied it. Technical
and business studies are preferred. General educa-
tion is rarely sufficient for clerical posts, and, at
executive levels, is likely to be interpreted as
showing a lack of motivation and orientation
towards work. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand,
one frequently comes across rules which discri-
minate between people who have been educated
to the same level, favouring, for instance,
honours graduates over general degree holders,
science specialists over arts specialists (only the
highest scorers are allowed into science streams
in secondary schools), those with credits and dis-
tinctions over those with passes (at the same level
of education), those with passes or credits in
notoriously 'difficult' as opposed to 'easy' sub-
jects, or those who have accumulated a certain
set of subject passes in fewer rather than more
sittings of the examinationall rules which, not
being concered with the substantive content of
what has been learned, only make sense if the
certificates are being used as some measure of
'general ability'.
This is a point of striking importance for the
academic debate between the proponents of
'human capital theory' and the advocates of
'screening theory' which has enlivened discussion
of the economics of education in recent years. I
did make the point in my book that these debates
are too often conductedgiven the mixture of
evidence (for example, a study in the US, regres-
sion analysis in France and a survey in Guate-
mala)as if they were debates about the role of
the school system in the economyas if the whole
world were the same. Even so, I had not realised
that the effects of variations in institutional
practices could be as striking as they proved to
be between Mexico and Sri Lanka. In the one
case, assumptions of 'human capital' operated
obviously. In the second, screening theory offered
a better explanation of what happened.
Standardised National Examinations
The other major difference between the two
countries lies in the fact that Sri Lanka has, and
Mexico does not have, a national system of
examinations. There are levels of achievement:
'Ordinary' and 'Advanced' school leaving certifi-
cates, and ordinary, honours and masters univer-
sity degrees. There are also gradations within
each level: pass, credit, distinction. The levels
and gradations are supposedly standardised across
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schools and universities. For employers, then,
they provide stable reference points for the reli-
able measurement of abilities. In Mexico,
graduating examinations (and in primary schools
grade-promotion examinations) are all internal to
the school so that grades achieved have little
universal meaning: no employer can be sure that
a 60 per cent mark from one school is worse or
even better than a 70 per cent mark from
another. At best, he can make the assumption
that someone who has passed all the promotion
and leaving examinations to get into a university
is likely to have an average or above-average mix
of ability and persistence. Competitive entrance
examinations for the 'best' universitiesand for
the 'best' high schools which prepare for them
are only just beginning, and the competition is
not yet very intense: hence there is no ability-
ranking significance generally attached to the
university or high school attended as happens in
other societies (where those who 'make it' into
Tokyo University or Oxbridge or the Grandes
Ecoles must, it is thought, be bright to do so).
Rationing of higher-education opportunity is
chiefly by the purse (or, because there is a good
deal of part-time study-while-you-work, by
strength of determination).
This difference is, of course, intimately related to
the human capital/screening difference. One
reason why Mexican employers do not use educa-
tional certificates as proxy measures of relative
'trainability', while Sri Lanka employers do, is
that the Sri Lankan, but not the Mexican, certifi-
cates represent a currency of known value; the
information they signal is more precise.
The extent to which national examination systems
do provide overall ability-ratings, and the seg-
ments of the ability range for which they do so,
vary from country to country. Britain, for
example, provides some kind of age-sixteen grad-
ing for the whole age group, marks off the 15 per
cent or so who get the two A levels necessary to
enter a university, and within them, the small
proportion who get into Oxbridge (competitively
rather than on the old boy network, though
there is no certain means of telling), those who
get firsts, etc. The Japanese system only provides
a rough division at the lower end of the range
between the lowest 10 per cent or so who do not
enter high school, the 40 per cent or so who
cannot get into a public or 'good private'
academic high school and are relegated to the
vocational and 'spillover private' high schools,
and the 15 per cent or so who go no further than
high school. But above that level, it provides a
highly refined ranking of the top 35 per cent who
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go to the universities. For the universities them-
selves are openly ranked by the difficulty of the
competitive examination that each sets to select
its students. France has a similar ranking (based
on the assumption that everyone would get into
the Grandes Ecoles if they could) for a tiny
minority at the top of the ability spectrum. And
so on. Whether, and over what range of jobs,
certificates are used for ability screening, depends
very much on how far the certificating system
lends itself to being so used. (To another kind of
screening, social class screening, we will return
in a moment.)
Bureaucracy
Part of my failure to give enough weight to the
difference between vocational qualifications and
general-education selection was a failure to put
enough stress on the 'bureaucratisation of
economic life' as a precondition for the latter. I
did recognise it implicitly when I argued that one
of the reasons why late-developing countries get
a worse bout of the diploma disease is that a
higher proportion of their modern sector employ-
ment is in highly bureaucratised organisations.
Nevertheless, it has more importance in the
genesis of certificate selection in industrial socie-
ties than I gave it. The chart below suggests a
rather crude outline scheme. That I have in mind
in suggesting a transition from the middle capita-
list to the bureaucratic (either Japanese capitalist
or Russian socialist) type of system, is this. It
was not an accident that in Britain it was the
East India Company and the civil service which,
whether willingly or not, pioneered the practice
of using general education attainments to select
recruits. They were the most bureaucratic
organisations in contemporary society in the
sense that a) their operations were rule-bound
and prescribed by a range of regulations designed
to check favouritism, and b) they took people notjust for jobs but for careers, and hence were
interested in the lifelong development potential
of a man, not in his specific ability to do a
particular job over the next six months. They
alone were Stage 5 organisations in my scheme,
whereas outside them, most of the rest of the
population was in Stage 4preparing for
apprenticeship and institutional training to earn
their living in fluid marketsdirectly selling ser-
vices or goods (carpenters, doctors, masons,
barbers) or selling their labour to employers
interested in filling certain job functions for
relatively short periods.
Gradually, however, Stage 5 organisations have
increased in importance: not only the vast
educational, social service, medical bureaucracies
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in the public sector, but also the ICIs, the Shells
in the private sector, organise systematic 'talent
searches' for the recruitment of the young for
'careers'. It is this which makes 'general ability',
'trainability' a central concern of a steadily
increasing proportion of hirings. Again it was
the Mexican and Sri Lanka comparison which
highlighted the importance of the link between
the organisation of work and the use of diplomas.
Sri Lankaor rather Sri Lanka's modern sector
is firmly in bureaucratic Stage 5, particularly
since state corporations are responsible for such
a large proportion of manufacturing. The Sri
Lanka study estimated that nearly a half of all
non-agricultural wage and salary employment in
Sri Lanka was accounted for by the public sector
or 'permanent employees' in the medium-to-large
private modern sector (in which the old merchant
houses, much imbued with old East India Com-
pany bureaucratic traditions, played a large role).
In Mexico, by contrast, not even the central
administration is properly bureaucratised. With
every sexennial change of President, the whole
civil service is turned upside-down. Careers are
far from secure. So, too, in the private sector;
labour markets remain extremely fluid and the
mobility of labour is brisk. Fewer hirings are
therefore seen as career hirings; immediate job
capabilities rather than long-term potentialities
and trainability are a more dominant concern.
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Class
I did mention at one stage, in discussing the
determinants of the diploma disease, that it
tended to be worse in the 'classless' societies of
Africawhere everyone was in the race for
successthan in class societies where aspirations
and perceptions of mobility possibilities were
likely to be lower for the subordinated lower
orders. But having mentioned it, I promptly
forgot about it.
Again the comparison between Mexico and Sri
Lanka or Ghana shows that one must not forget
about it. Mexico is a society with historically
deeply rooted class divisions. I shall never forget
my astonishment when (in 1976, not several
decades ago) the Mayoress of a little town in
Guanajuato produced her draft for a publicity
brochure describing the town: 'San Jose', it raid,
'has two classes, the middle class and the humble
class. The middle class has three meals a day
and the humble class two. . . . As for the
relations between the classes, it seems to be one
largely of indifference, since the humble class
shows little sign of wishing to better itself'. By
contrast, even in Sri Lanka, which was tradi-
tionally a caste society, one would be hard pressed
to find such matter-of-fact acceptance of class
differences in a public document.
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These differences do have considerable conse-
quences for the extent to which the village school
becomes predominantly defined as the place
where one gets the exit visas from the village,
and the extent to which the so-called primary
leaving certificate exam is seen only as a com-
petitive secondary entrance exam. They affect
the extent to which those who leave the school
system with such a certificate are thought of, not
as carrying with them some celebration of their
accomplishment, but as being 'drop-outs'with
all the backwash effects of examination-orienta-
tion, the problems of 'relevance' etc, which
naturally result from these conceptions of the
purpose of schooling.
In Ghana, Kwasi Boakye found these features
present to a high degree. The present generation
of leaders started in the village and the present
generation of village children see no reason why
they should not follow in their footsteps to
become leaders. Where everyone is in the race,
the 'updraught' in the system is strong. Not so
in Mexico. Nigel Brooke's villagers, and especially
those of Tarascan Indian culture, often men and
women who still bore the bruises of unpleasant
experiences in trying to make their way in the
city, were not prone to see much prospect, in
their class society, for the advancement of their
children by means of certificates. They did want
their children to read and write and to be able
to stand up to officials. But there was little com-
petitive pursuit of academic success, little back-
wash from mobility aspirations.
The other aspect of the class society syndrome
was the discovery, in the Mexican labour market
survey, of a different form of screening from the
ones discussed abovenot ability screening, nor
attitude screening ('if a man opted for business
studies it shows he's got the right motivation'),
but class screening. The correlation between
class status and university attendance has until
recently been sufficiently close for employers to
be able to assume that graduates have a much
higher probability of being congenial and loyal,
of 'fitting in', of having a good presence, a good
way with customers. etc. One or two employers
deplored the 'democratisation' of the university
which reduced the certainty that graduates would
have such qualities.
The China Cure
Brooke found that, although there was little
diploma disease backwash from selection exam-
inations spoiling the chance of 'good and
relevant' village primary education, there were
plenty of other factors which ensured that village
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children had poor quality education, of little
relevance to their future lives, and giving them
little beyond the basic skills of literacy and
numeracy. That, of course, is a finding highly
relevant to my argument about 'delinking' the
school from occupational selection. I suggested
that, unless recruitment patterns were altered so
that the schools were relieved of the difficult
balancing job of trying to combine the function
of educating children with the function of sort-
ing and labelling them, improving the quality of
education would be an impossible task. I specified
this as a necessary condition. I was at least
careful not to claim that it would be sufficient.
The great question when I wrote, of course, was
how far the Chinese attempt to 'delink' would
succeed in making education more generally
effective as a preparation for life as it has to be
lived in China. I was favourably, if in some
respects sceptically, disposed, though perhaps the
most blush-making sentence in the book is the
one in which I say that the Chinese system seems
to have changed so fundamentally that it is likely
to stay changed! I was scepticaland Jonathan
Unger had already fed me a great deal of infor
mation on the problems of Chinese education in
the period 1970-74on two grounds: first that
the absence of the objective achievement test
standard was leading to selection by favouriti6m;
secondly that there were enormous functional
difficulties in systems of selection which refused to
recognise differences in human talent and
developed skills, which recruited people for
engineering courses on the basis of their devotion
to approved political ideals without checking
whether they could add two and two to make
four.
Unger's work, and subsequent discoveries since
the 'mess in education' has been exposed as not
the least of the Gang of Four's crimes, show that
there were, indeed, very serious problems.
Favouritism was apparently rampant at both the
crucial points: first when children were allocated
on graduation to their initial work units (the
favoured to the town factories, the disfavoured
to the country), and, secondly, when they
appliedas they could after two yearsfor
admission to a tertiary institution. Attempts to
enforce standards either at the point of entry to,
or within, higher education institutions were very
much liable to be denounced as capitalist-roaders'
plots.
There appear to have been two other problems.
First, the teachers were demoralised. Liberated
as they were from examination pressures, they
did not know what to do with their freedom. A
large proportion of them, having had the
humiliating experience of being denouncedand
perhaps physically maltreatedby one or other
faction during the Cultural Revolution, were in
no mood to risk an initiative. It was safer to
concentrate loyally on encouraging the memorisa-
tion of Mao's thoughts.
Secondly, it seems that higher education institu-
tions never were (with few exceptions) trans-
formed into in-service, career-development
institutions. The small number of exceptions
included engineering departments which took
technicians from factories, upgraded their skills,
and sent them back to their factories. But the
vast majority remained what they had been
before: institutions for pre-career qualification.
The Normal Colleges in Shanghai and Peking,
for instance, did not take, say, experienced
primary teachers and upgrade them into school
principals or senior secondary teachers. They con-
tinued to be places where youths at the start of
their career could get a ticket of entry to a middle
class occupation and so escape from traditional
sector work in the communes. The reforms only
meant that one had to wait out two years of
hard labour on the farm before one could apply
for entry; secondly that entry was supposed to
depend on 'redness' (but often depended on
favouritism), and thirdly, that you did not need
actually to know anything to graduate, provided
that you could make vociferous and sincere
political speeches. At least that is how the
reforms are described nowadays in China, though
doubtless with a touch of exaggeration.
Presumably it had to be like that. To have
revamped the higher education system entirely
on the lines of the engineering departments just
mentionedmaking all tertiary education a
means of furthering the education and training of
people in careers they had already startedwould
have condemned the millions of young urban
secondary leavers 'sent down' to the country, to
staying in the country all their lives. The chance
to apply for a university after two years and so
get back on track for an urban professional
occupation the mere existence of that chance-
was perhaps necessary to reconcile them to the
vast sending down operation.
At añy rate, the China chapter is one in the book
which I suppose I should certainly rewrite if I
had the chance. Not many people have asked me
with schaden freudelich glee: 'so what price your
modest proposals now, when even China has
admitted its error?' But I suppose what I would
want to say would be an implicit answer to that
question. The fact that the 1970-76 Chinese
system collapsed with few regrets is not proof of
the unviability of a real 'delinking' effort on the
lines I proposed in the book, viz:
genuinely revamping higher education on
recurrent, in-service lines;
developing criteria which take account of the
range of clearly relevant differences in human
achievement and potential in selecting people
for initial career experience and for sub-
sequent upgrading;
eliminating, or at least vastly reducing, the
importance of selection in the processes of
schooling and education; and, finally,
engaging creative teachers in the develop-
ment of a new, workable pedagogy which
might get children learning either from
interest or from a conviction of the substan-
tive worth of what they are learning.
Is it really impossible to create schools with-
out the goal of the bread-and-butter, certificate-
seeking, lifelessly instrumental motive for learn-
ing which, I persist in believing, is steadily
eroding the quality of schooling throughout the
world?
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